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"[A] f men agree that what is just in distribution must be according to
merit . . " Aristotle said.' Conceding that "merit" was ambiguous 2
he said it involved excellence, an individual's intellectual and moral
virtue.' Justice required the distribution of honors, wealth, and safety in
proportion to excellence.' Today, merit is still considered a preferable, if
not unquestionably ideal, method of regulating the distribution of
opportunities.' For purposes of this discussion, merit refers to that
combination of qualities, experiences, and achievements which, in the
eyes of those in American society who set the standards, constitutes
excellence and thus makes one deserving of access and advancement in
employment and education. Despite its perennial endorsement, the
distribution of opportunities on the basis of merit is unfair. Merit is not a
socially neutral concept. Distribution on its basis is therefore inherently
biased, procedurally and substantively.
Merit is considered an appropriate method of distribution because
it is thought to be fair.' This is best illustrated by comparing our
meritocratic method of distribution with two other methods that are
considered unfair. Despite actions to the contrary, our society regards the
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1. Aristotle. Niehomachean Ethics, Book V., at 112 (W.D. Ross trans. rev. ed. 1980).
2. In his discussion of merit, Aristotle noted that "[men] do not all specify the same sort of
merit. but democrats identify it with the status of freeman, supporters of oligarchy with
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distribution of opportunities in proportion to a person's wealth or on the
basis of a person's race or sex as unfair. The former is considered unfair
because it restricts access to educational and employment opportunities
on the basis of something that presupposes individual or familial access.
In other words, the oligarchical theory of distribution is based on
something that has been previously distributed, perhaps unfairly, by
social policies. Particularly in a society that requires a certain level of
poverty, wealth is structural, not individual. The latter is considered
unfair because race and sex are immutable characteristics, for which
individuals are not responsible. Treating people differently on the basis of
something they can do nothing about is considered unfair. Sex, race, and
wealth also have nothing to do with individual capacity. Distribution on
the basis of merit, its advocates contend, does not suffer from these
deficiencies. Merit is not distributed by existing social institutions like
wealth or randomly by nature like race or sex, but instead is something
that is achieved by individuals themselves according to their capaci-
ties.
I reject this conclusion. The meritocratic method of distribution, as
it exists today, suffers from all of the deficiencies identified in the
alternative methods of distribution discussed above. Indeed, it is these
methods, stripped of their substantive identifiers. Merit is a standard for
distribution that presupposes access to the conditions for achieving merit,
access which is systematically denied on the basis of sex, race, and class.
More deeply, merit as this society defines it has nothing to do with
individual capacity generally; it has to do with the capacities developed in
and valued by white men. The meritocratic method of distribution is even
more heinous than those previously discussed because it masquerades as
fair, neutral, and socially unspecific, and is therefore resistant to
attack.
Accept, for a moment, this existing concept of merit as given.
Access to the conditions for achieving this merit is systematically denied
to women and people of color. Those who say this is not true narrowly
define such access as the permission to participate in merit-gathering
activities. In other words, if women and people of color are not forbidden
from seeking merit, they have access. According to those who embrace
this position, that access is not only present, but is increasingly protected
by laws forbidding its denial on the basis of sex or race. This conclusion is
unrealistic. Rules prohibiting the denial of access on the basis of sex or
race do not preclude those regulating such access from exercising their
discretion consonant with their values. I n addition, truly equal access has
to mean more than simply the opportunity to be a white man. Access
necessarily includes not only the permission to participate, but the liberty
and the ability to do so as women and people of color.
[Vol. 1:.155
ARGUMENT
Women and people of color lack the ability to participate because
they have been denied a validated opportunity to develop and illustrate
their capacities as women and people of color, hence as individuals. This
denial has been effectuated in a number of different ways. Women and
people of color are denied an equal chance to develop merit as a result of
attendance at elementary and secondary schools that erase their cultures
and heritage and ignore their realities, thus delegitimizing their life
experiences. They are excluded from information systems that encourage
and support participation in merit-gathering activities. As the poorest
members of society, they lack the resources to participate. Their
participation is limited by a socialization process that creates a class that
does not seek to participate because they identify such participation with
white men.' Their lack of participation is virtually assured by a society
that not only denies these groups the respect that builds self-image and
nourishes capacities, but also generates and perpetuates self-hatred and a
belief in their own inferiority.
More fundamentally unfair is the inherent bias in the concept of
merit itself. This is a result of what Andrea Dworkin calls the power of
naming; "[t]his power of naming enables men to define experience, to
articulate boundaries and values, to designate to each thing its realm and
qualities, to determine what can and cannot be expressed, to control
perception itself."' Merit is defined by white men to reward what white
men become. Merit, as we know it, explicitly values particular experi-
ences and abilities-the ones developed by white upper class men-and
therefore implicitly devalues others. They define the content of the
standard according to capacities their situation finds valuable and name it
"excellence." Meritocracy calls those who conform to this standard
"equal." Tlose who are different, it names "unqualified." The relative
worth of particular experiences is not my issue; the ability of white men to
control the determination of their relative worth is. The content of the
notion of merit, in and of itself, excludes and devalues women and people
of color. The distribution of opportunities on that basis necessarily
excludes and devalues them also.
Proponents of the merit system consider its abrogation or modifi-
cation equivalent to the creation of a preference for those less-qualified
individuals. They cannot see that the standard is tautologous with a
particular outlook-that of white men. In short, they believe white men
are superior. Preferential treatment, they argue, creates and maintains a
stigma that certain groups are unable to achieve success on the basis of
7. K. Powers, Sex Segregation and theAmbivalent Directions of Sex Discrimination Law,
1979 Wis. L Rev. 55, 98.
8. A. Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing Women.I7 (1981).
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their individual merit. In addition, they contend, such a preference is
unfair to "innocent people" (white men) who are excluded because of the
preference, even though they are qualified. These arguments are based on
the assumption that any qualification on the merit system distorts its
gleaming neutrality. They ignore the fact that the content of the standard
of merit itself prefers white maleness; its abrogation or modification is
necessary to eliminate that preference. The elimination of that preference
is not unfair simply because those people who were disproportionately
successful under the merit system are no longer preferred. A truly neutral
method of distributing employment and educational opportunities will
not sacrifice quality, simply homogeneity. Quality, it will redefine.
Distribution of employment and educational opportunities on the
basis of merit continues to enjoy a reputation of impartiality. The near-
exclusive selection of white men as possessors of merit and therefore as
appropriate beneficiaries of such opportunities is not consistent with that
reputation. The existing meritocracy is obviously biased. Until women
and people of color have complete access to the conditions for achieving
merit and to contribute to the definition of the content of merit itself, the
meritocratic method of distribution will continue to favor white men, in
spite of all intentions to be fair.
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